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The need to reform the labour market in Germany is
urgent. With the enactment of the “Hartz laws”
(named after the chairman of the reform commis-
sion) the federal government has introduced funda-
mental reforms in some areas of the labour market.
The government is thereby aiming at an increase in
employment and,particularly,at a reduction of long-
term unemployment.The labour market reforms are
meant to “activate” recipients of social benefits.The
guiding principle is the well-known “right-and-duty”
principle.
The labour market reforms include the establishment
of temporary work agencies for the previously unem-
ployed (“Personnel Service Agencies”), the introduc-
tion of a subsidy for setting up a one-person company
(“Me Inc.”), new regulations for low-paid employ-
ment (“mini” and “midi jobs”) as well as the restruc-
turing of the Bundesagentur für Arbeit (Federal La-
bour Office) to become a service-oriented institution.
Restructuring involves reorganising the placement of
job seekers by increasing the use of private employ-
ment services and by intensifying counselling (“Hartz
I-III”). In addition, two major benefit programmes,
unemployment insurance and social assistance, are
being reformed.This is being done by combining un-
employment assistance and social assistance to form a
new “unemployment benefit II”, by increasing earn-
ings disregards for welfare recipients, by imposing
sanctions for those who refuse an acceptable job of-
fer, etc. (“Hartz IV”), as well as by shortening the
period in which the (contributory) “unemployment
benefit I” can be received (Table 1).
The old system of unemployment insurance and
social assistance
Until the end of 2004 there was a three-pronged sys-
tem in Germany which provided protection against
the risk of becoming unemployed and other income
risks. In this system, unemployment benefits were
part of a compulsory form of insurance financed by
contributions.The benefits for the unemployed with
at least one dependent child amounted to 67 percent
CESifo DICE Report 2/2005 18
Forum
* Wolfgang Ochel is senior researcher at the Ifo Institute for Eco-
nomic Research at the University of Munich and CESifo Research
Fellow. Gratitude is expressed to Wolfgang Meister for providing
calculations using the Ifo tax model.
Table 1 
“Hartz laws” 
Law Passed Measures Effective as of
First law for modern services on the
labour market ("Hartz I") 
December 2002  Setting up Personnel Service Agen-
cies
1 January 2003 
Second law for modern services on
the labour market ("Hartz II") 
December 2002  Introduction of one-person compa-
nies (“Me Inc.”); Reform of low-
paid jobs (“mini” and “midi jobs”)
1 January 2003 
and 1 April 2003 
Third law for modern services on
the labour market ("Hartz III") 
December 2003  Restructuring of the Federal Labour
Office
1 January 2004 
Fourth law for modern services on
the labour market ("Hartz IV")
December 2003  Unemployment assistance and 
social assistance combined to form
unemployment benefit II; new
definition of acceptable jobs, sanc-
tions; increased earnings disregards;
community service 
1 January 2005 
Law to reform the labour market September 2003 Duration of unemployment benefit
I shortened 
1 February 2006
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of the earlier net income and to 60 percent for those
without children. Unemployment benefits were paid
without any means test. The maximum duration of
benefits was between 6 and 32 months,depending on
age and the period covered by contributions. After
this period, means-tested unemployment assistance
was paid for an unlimited period of time. Unem-
ployment assistance was financed via taxes.The ben-
efit amounted to 57 or 53 percent for recipients with
and without children, respectively. Social assistance
provided the basic welfare net.Again, benefits were
means-tested and paid for an unlimited period of
time. Social assistance benefits were only paid if the
individual seeking help was unable to help himself
and no other welfare benefits were available.1 As the
comparison shows, unemployment assistance had an
intermediary position between unemployment bene-
fits and social assistance. As with unemployment
benefits the amount of unemployment assistance de-
pended on the last net earnings.However,because of
the unlimited entitlement together with a means test,
it was a second form of basic welfare benefit,as is un-
derlined by the fact that it was financed by taxes in-
stead of contributions.
This system of unemployment insurance and social
assistance has contributed in an important way to
the high unemployment in Germany, especially
among poorly qualified workers.There is fairly clear
micro evidence that a longer benefit entitlement
leads to longer unemployment duration (Nickell et
al.2005).As was shown above,the duration of unem-
ployment benefits was long and payment of unem-
ployment assistance was even unlimited. Further-
more, the level of benefits has a negative effect on
the transition from unemployment to employment
because high benefits are connected with high reser-
vation wages. Since companies
are not willing to pay high wages
to take on workers with low per-
formance,unemployment becomes
permanent. At the end of 2004,
the effective net replacement rate
for recipients of unemployment
assistance (including additional
benefits for the recipient and, if
necessary, other household mem-
bers) was approximately 80 per-
cent for a single and about 90 per-
cent for a single parent (Breyer et
al. 2004, 32). Social assistance (including housing
assistance) amounted to 65 percent of average net
earnings for a family with one gainfully employed
parent and two children in Western Germany (Sinn
et al. 2003, 14). Compared with net earnings derived
from low-wage employment the net replacement
rates were even higher.
In the end,the incentive to take on a job depends on
the additional net income it would provide. Recipi-
ents of unemployment assistance who did not work
longer than 15 hours a week could earn up to an ad-
ditional EUR 165 per month.Net income above that
was completely set off against unemployment assis-
tance.With social assistance benefits, earned income
up to 25 percent of the normal rate of benefits (EUR
74 monthly) was not set off against social assistance.
Thereafter the rate by which transfers were reduced
amounted to 85 percent.That means that the income
available to social welfare recipients increased by a
mere 15 percent of the additional earned income.A
net earned income over EUR 568 led to a transfer
reduction rate of 100 percent (Sachverständigenrat
2005; Box 16). For the recipients of unemployment
and social assistance the high rates of transfer reduc-
tion show that the incentive to earn additional in-
come was minimal.
The growth in the number of unemployed is shown
in Figure 1. During the 1960s, average annual unem-
ployment was less than 200,000 persons. Thereafter
unemployment increased from one economic down-
turn to the next. In 2004 an average of 4.4 million
people were unemployed,many of them for the long
term. Part of this problem was caused by German
unification. But a considerable percentage of unem-
ployment, specifically of persons with minimal qual-
1 In 2003 2.02 million people received
unemployment benefits, 2.03 million un-
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Figure 1ifications,can be attributed to the effects of the Ger-
man welfare system. Figure 1 shows that of the per-
sons registered as unemployed in 2004,approximate-
ly 34.3 percent have not completed vocational train-
ing, this figure being the mean between the Western
German level of 41.1 percent and the Eastern Ger-
man level of 20.6 percent.The proportion of employ-
able individuals without vocational training is 17 per-
cent in Western and 8 percent in Eastern Germany.
Thus, the specific rate of unemployment for persons
without vocational training is 21.7 percent in Western
Germany and 51.2 percent in Eastern Germany
(Reinberg and Hummel 2005).
An overview of “Hartz IV” 
The core area of the labour market reforms of the
Social Democrat–Green Party coalition government
includes the measures put into effect by “Hartz IV”
(and the complementary shortening of the period in
which contributory unemployment benefits can be
received). As mentioned above, these measures aim
at activating recipients of unemployment benefits
and are based on the “right-and-duty” principle.
Starting from February 2006, the period in which
unemployment benefits can be received will be short-
ened for the unemployed up to 55 years of age to 12
months and for those over 55 to at most 18 months.
With this law Germany is approaching the regulations
that exist in most of the OECD countries. Shortening
the period during which unemployment benefits can
be received is in line with research findings for Ger-
many according to which long-term unemployment
will be reduced by this measure (Steiner 2003).
Starting from January 2005, unemployment assis-
tance and social assistance were combined for people
able to work to form unemployment benefit II. The
new benefit is means-tested, the benefit level being
similar to that of the old social assistance benefit.
Individuals who are unable to work will continue to
receive social assistance. For recipients of unemploy-
ment benefit II there are no limits as to what jobs are
acceptable. If a recipient rejects a job, he will have to
face sanctions in the form of a reduction of unem-
ployment benefits for a limited time. At the same
time, earnings disregards have been increased in
order to make it more attractive to take on work.
If it is not possible to integrate benefit recipients in
the regular labour market, community jobs will be
offered to them, as could be done in the past on the
basis of the federal social assistance law (“help to
work”).These jobs may include, for example, activi-
ties to improve the social infrastructure at the mu-
nicipal level. Recipients of unemployment benefit II
will receive compensation for their extra expenses in
connection with this work (Koch and Walwei 2004).
Unemployment benefit II: the new safety net for
job seekers
Since January 2005, those in need of help who are
able to work and cannot claim unemployment bene-
fit I receive,as explained above,unemployment ben-
efit II. Apart from housing and heating assistance,
responsibility for unemployment benefit II lies with
the Federal Labour Office. It is financed by the fed-
eral government.Within the scope of an experimen-
tal clause, some municipalities are allowed to take
over the responsibility for all the tasks connected
with operating the basic safety net for job seekers.
Granting social assistance to those unfit for work
continues to be the responsibility of the municipali-
ties (Löschau 2005).
Individuals are considered able to work if they are
capable of working for three hours a day under the
usual conditions of the labour market and will not be
hindered to do so in the foreseeable future because
of illness or handicap.The individual working ability
is evaluated purely from a medical standpoint. It is
decided by the institution responsible for the safety
net, i.e., usually the local employment office.
An individual is needy if he/she is unable to earn a liv-
ing for him/herself and for the other family members
living together in one household. The individual in
question is required to take on an acceptable job and
use his own income and assets as well as that of
his/her partner. There are, however, allowances; cer-
tain assets are not taken into account at all (Bun-
desministerium für Wirtschaft und Arbeit 2004).
The monthly standard payment for unemployment
benefit II amounts to EUR 345 in the first 6 months
of 2005 for singles or single parents in Western Ger-
many (including Berlin) and EUR 331 in Eastern
Germany. For children the standard payments are
lower.Furthermore – if certain preconditions are ful-
filled – there is an additional supplement limited to
two years for those who move from unemployment
benefit I to unemployment benefit II. Needy, non-
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employable individuals who live in a household with
an employable recipient of unemployment benefit II
are entitled to receive a new social benefit (Sozial-
geld). In addition to these lump sum transfers the
actual costs for lodging and heating are provided, if
deemed appropriate,as well as compulsory social in-
surance contributions and payments for special
needs (Table 2).
Unemployment benefit II is very similar to the for-
mer social assistance benefit.The standard payment
in Western Germany (EUR 345) is higher than the
social assistance benefit (EUR 295 since July 2004);
nevertheless social assistance benefits included more
additional payments than unemployment benefit II.
In comparison to former unemployment assistance
(on average EUR 550 in 2003 in Western Germany)
unemployment benefit II is less generous.2This should
result in pressure on the jobless to take on work.
Furthermore, there will be an increased tendency to
take on work because the stricter means test leads to a
reduction in the percentage of unemployed who re-
ceive benefits.
Sanctions
Transfer payments will not only be less generous
because of their (assumed) reduction but also be-
cause of the tightening of the eligibility criteria. Of
particular importance is the new definition of em-
ployment that a recipient of unemployment benefit
II must accept. According to “Hartz IV” every kind
of work is basically acceptable. A job cannot be
turned down because it does not correspond to an
individual’s profession or education or because the
conditions are less favourable than in the last job
held.3 Compensation below the collectively bar-
gained wage rate or local wages does not make the
job less acceptable.The offer may not, however, be a
violation of the law (for example, a universally bind-
ing collective agreement) or contra bonos mores.Ac-
cording to current judicial decisions such a violation
would occur, for example, if payment was 30 percent
below local wages.
Those who reject acceptable work (but also training,
community service or placement services) shall
receive 30 percent less of the standard transfer pay-
ment for three months (approximately EUR 100
less).For the same period,the limited supplementary
payment will also be withdrawn.If work is rejected a
second time the transfer payments are reduced once
more by EUR 100.If there are repeated violations of
any obligations, unemployment benefit II is elimi-
nated entirely. If individuals under 25 years of age
reject work, they receive no transfer payments at all
for three months. The costs for lodging and heating
during this period are paid directly to the landlord
(Bundesagentur für Arbeit 2004).
The question arises whether the sanctions imple-
mented by “Hartz IV” will encourage recipients of
Table 2 
Unemployment benefit II: Lump sum standard payment (SP)
Single or
single parent Other household members
Children up to
14 years of age 
each
Children between 15 
and 18 years of age
each
Adults (19 years of
age andabove)
each
100% SP 60% SP 80% SP 90% SP
Western Germany includ-
ing Berlin 345  207  276  311 
Eastern Germany 331  199  265  298 
Additionally per household:
 Transfer for lodging and heating
 (If the preconditions are fulfilled), a limited additionalpayment of up to EUR 160 for
gainfully employedindividuals and for their partners andup to EUR 60 for each child
 Contributions to compulsory social insurance (health, nursing care andold age)
Source: Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Arbeit (2004).
2 It should be taken into account, however, that the recipients of
unemployment benefit II also receive payments for their actual
costs for lodging whereas the recipients of unemployment assis-
tance could only qualify for supplementary social welfare assistance
and housing assistance if they fulfilled special conditions.As there is
no statistical information on this point, the impact of this addition-
al transfer cannot be estimated at the present time. It is thus impos-
sible to state with certainty whether transfer payments have become
less generous after the introduction of “Hartz IV” or not.
3 Taking on work is, however, not acceptable when, for example,
children up to the age of three must be taken care of or other fam-
ily members require nursing care.unemployment benefit II to take on work. This will
of course depend on the actual implementation of
the sanctions. The Federal Labour Office in Ger-
many has had experience with the imposition of
sanctions. Its agencies suspended benefits temporar-
ily also in the past if benefit recipients rejected ac-
ceptable work. Similarly, the municipalities have im-
posed sanctions on social assistance recipients who
in some way did not fulfil their obligations within the
scope of the “help to work” programme (municipal
employment promotion). Valid data on the imple-
mentation of sanctions are not available, however.
The Federal Labour Office (Bundesagentur für Ar-
beit 2003) has figures on the number of sanctions
imposed,4 but not on the number of acceptable jobs
that were not accepted.The same is true of the sanc-
tions imposed by the municipalities.5 According to
experts sanctions have been imposed in relatively
few cases when recipients had not accepted work
(Gerhardt 2004).And only 41 percent of all sanctions
that were imposed were actually executed (Wilke
2003).With the introduction of “Hartz IV” it is ques-
tionable whether the imposition of sanctions will
become stricter. On the one hand, the burden of
proof for rejecting acceptable work now lies in the
hands of the unemployed. On the other hand,“clev-
er” individuals will always be able to escape sanc-
tions.Moreover,the employees of the placement ser-
vices and the municipalities are often reluctant to
impose sanctions.
The effectiveness of “Hartz IV” sanctions not only
depends on how they are implemented but also on
how the unemployed react to them. For Germany
there are no studies on this issue.The microeconomet-
ric studies by Abbring et al.(2000),van den Berg et al.
(2003) and Lalive et al.(2002) for the Netherlands and
Switzerland indicate that sanc-
tions are an effective instrument
to increase the integration of the
unemployed in the labour market.
The meta-evaluation of Ashworth
et al. (2004) shows for the US the
resounding success of sanctions as
a measure to reduce unemploy-
ment. Further studies show that the positive effects 
are not only a product of the sanctions themselves (ex-
post effects) but are brought about in anticipation of
possible sanctions (ex-ante effects).
Increased earnings disregards
The previous system of unemployment insurance
and social assistance benefits offered little incentive
to work.“Hartz IV” has improved this situation.With
unemployment benefit II, the reduction of transfer
payments depends on gross earned income. Beyond
an allowance of around EUR 50 there is a transfer
reduction rate of 85 percent of the net earned income
up to a gross income of EUR 400. For gross earned
income between EUR 400 and EUR 900 there is a
transfer reduction rate of only 70 percent for the cor-
responding net earned income. For income between
EUR 900 and 1500 the transfer reduction rate rises
again to 85 percent. For gross earned income over
EUR 1500 unemployment benefit II is reduced at a
rate of one for one.
The incentive effects are further clarified in Figure 2.
The figure shows the new gross-net income curve in
comparison to the old social assistance system and in
comparison to a welfare-to-work policy suggested by
the Ifo Institute (Sinn et al.2003).All the curves take
into account total taxes, social insurance contribu-
tions and income from public transfers (social assis-
tance, housing allowance, child benefit). For the tax
regulations and the social insurance contributions
the status quo at the beginning of 2005 for Western
Germany was assumed. The figure is based on the
case of a family with two children.The relevant graph
indicates that a recipient of unemployment benefit II
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4 Of 4.87 million cases of unemployment
benefits and unemployment assistance
granted in 2003,some 185,000 periods of ex-
clusion from benefits were imposed be-
cause employment offers were rejected or
integration measures were not completed
(Bundesagentur für Arbeit 2003,79 and 93).
5 In 2002 101 cities reduced welfare assis-
tance in 11,800 cases (with 92,794 individ-
uals in community service programmes)
(Fuchs and Troost 2003, 34).
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with a gross earned income of up to EUR 400 has 
to return 85 Cent of every Euro earned. Between 
EUR 400 and EUR 900 he has to go without 80 Cent
as a result of transfer reductions if he earns one Euro
more.6 Between EUR 900 and EUR 1500 the trans-
fer reduction is on average 88 percent for every extra
Euro of gross income earned.7 Except for the income
range above EUR 900 the transfer reduction rate of
singles is the same as that of families (Table 3). In
comparison to the old social assistance system for
recipients of unemployment benefit II the financial
incentive to work has been slightly improved. The
transfer reduction rate for the unemployed taking on
work is, however, still very high. In contrast, the Ifo
proposal (see below) offers increased earnings disre-
gards, especially in the lowest earnings brackets
(Sinn 2004, 234–43).
Community service
Even though achieving gainful employment has pri-
ority, short-term jobs are offered to recipients of
unemployment benefit II by municipalities and char-
itable associations.This work should be in the public
interest and it should not displace regular employ-
ment.Offering this work to the unemployed who are
difficult to place is meant to promote their entry into
the regular labour market. Furthermore, it offers an
opportunity to check whether those unemployed are
actually available for the labour market. According
to the Federal Ministry for Economy and Labour,up
to 600,000 jobs are to be created for this purpose. In
2004, there were approximately 210,000 municipal
jobs (Sachverständigenrat 2005, Ziffer 252).
For community service jobs the recipients of unem-
ployment benefit II receive 1 to 2 Euros per hour in
addition to their unemployment benefits as compen-
sation for additional costs.In contrast to income from
regular employment this additional payment is not
set off against unemployment benefit II.This means
that the effective hourly wages can be higher for a
municipal job than for regular employment. If com-
pensation of 1 Euro per hour and a working week of
35 hours is assumed, a single employed in the regu-
lar labour market would have to earn a gross income
of EUR 652 per month (= EUR 4.30 per hour) to
have the same net income of someone employed in
community service. With compensation of EUR 1.50
he would have to earn EUR 1,173 per month (= EUR
7.73 per hour) to reach the same net income. With
compensation of EUR 2.00 per hour, it would be
EUR 1,313 (= EUR 8.66 per hour; Figure 3). This
comparison shows that the incentive to take on a reg-
ular job for recipients of unemployment benefit II
who are employed in community service is relatively
low (Buscher 2004).The Social Insurance Code, how-
ever,clearly prescribes that taking on regular employ-
ment has priority over staying in a temporary munic-
ipal job. If regular employment deemed acceptable is
rejected by the unemployed individual, the sanctions
described above apply.
In addition to the danger that community service
might become a permanent segment in the labour
market, there is also concern that regular employ-
ment will be displaced by community service.Despite
the rules for community service, municipal work that
up until now has been carried out by private compa-
nies could now be undertaken by municipal employ-
ment agencies at a lower price. The displacement ef-
fect would, however, be compensated by the fact that
the money saved could be used to award contracts to
private companies for other work. Furthermore, pri-
vate companies could profit in that community ser-
vice would bar entry into the shadow economy,and in
this way the demand for moonlighting would be de-
flected into the regular market.
Table 3 













Married couple with two children
  50  –   400
b) 85 79 3
400  –   900  80 95 71
900  – 1500 88 100 71
Single
  50  –   400
b) 85 79 4
400  –   900  80 95 71
900  – 1500 69 …
c) 68
a) Status quo 2005 assumed for tax regulations and 
social insurance contributions. -
b) Allowance for
unemployment benefit II of EUR 50. -
c) No claim
to social benefits.
Source: Calculations of the Ifo Institute.
6 The difference between the transfer reduction rate as specified in
the “Hartz IV” law (70 percent between EUR 400 and EUR 900)
and the reduction rate in Table 3 (80 percent) is due to the fact that
in the first case the reduction rate relates to net earned income and
in the second case to gross earned income. In the EUR 400 brack-
et the two transfer reduction rates are the same because net and
gross income is the same in this case (regulations for “mini jobs”).
See the detailed account in Boss and Elendner (2005).
7 The odd shape of the curve between EUR 1,600 and EUR 2,050
gross earned income is the result of a special “child supplement”to
unemployment benefit II.Summary
With “Hartz IV”, Germany started thoroughly re-
forming an important part of the labour market,
thereby contributing to an activation of recipients of
welfare benefits.Especially the long-term unemployed
and recipients of social assistance have been targeted
in an effort to reintegrate them into the labour mar-
ket. The guiding principle behind this reform is the
“right-and-duty” principle. The most important ele-
ments of the reform are the reduction of the duration
of unemployment benefit I, the combination of un-
employment assistance and social assistance to form
a new unemployment benefit II, the reduction of
transfer payments compared to the old unemploy-
ment assistance scheme, stricter sanctions if accept-
able work is rejected, the increase of earnings disre-
gards for recipients of unemployment benefit II,and
the expansion of jobs in community service. These
measures primarily aim at reducing the reservation
wage of the unemployed and thus at increasing the
demand for labour.
The “Hartz IV”reforms make important steps in the
right direction. They will make it easier for unem-
ployed welfare recipients to find regular employment.
It is still too early, however, to estimate the extent of
the effect on employment (and their fiscal effects).
This will be left to the evaluations that will accompa-
ny “Hartz IV” (Kaltenborn et al. 2004). However,
some deficiencies connected with “Hartz IV” are al-
ready under discussion. The earnings disregards for
recipients of unemployment benefit II have not been
increased sufficiently.8 Moreover the incentives for
the employed in low-wage jobs to
work more and/or to attempt to
earn higher wages are not ade-
quate. Both issues are connected
with the fact that the government
was not willing to reduce the min-
imum level of unemployment
benefit II. Furthermore, compen-
sation of 1 to 2 Euros for commu-
nity work has resulted in a weak
incentive to enter regular employ-
ment. And finally sanctions lead
to bureaucratic decision-making
processes and legal checks that
could be avoided with sufficient
financial incentives.
The Ifo Institute’s suggestion for an “activating social
assistance”scheme is mainly based on financial incen-
tives.It calls for a notable reduction of unemployment
benefit II for those able but not willing to work and a
lower transfer reduction rate in the lowest income
bracket (Table 3).At the same time, the employed in
low-wage jobs would be offered favourable condi-
tions for earning additional income. For each addi-
tionally earned euro of gross income at least 30 Cents
could be kept as additional net income.Those who do
not immediately find employment in the private sec-
tor have the right to a community job with compen-
sation corresponding to the standard rate of unem-
ployment benefit II. The municipalities would have
the right to assign these workers to private companies
through private temporary work agencies (Sinn et al.
2003, Sinn 2004, chapter 4).The Ifo proposal makes it
possible for recipients of welfare benefits to accept
lower wages,which would lead in turn to an increased
demand for labour on the part of the employers.
However, a larger wage dispersion at the bottom end
of the wage distribution would require the co-opera-
tion of both the employers and the unions.
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